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Plaintiff/Appellant Vickie L. Collins ("Collins"), by her counsel of record, Brian 
S. King, and Richard R. Burke of King & Isaacson, P.C., hereby reply to 
Defendant/Appellee's ("the Center's") brief: 
I THIS COURT MUST REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DIRECTED VERDICT BECAUSE COLLINS PRESENTED 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE CENTER'S NEGLIGENCE, 
The undisputed facts show that Collins presented competent evidence of the 
Center's negligence. Collins had the burden to present a prima facie claim of 
negligence. If Collins presented competent evidence of the Center's negligence, the trial 
court erred in granting the Center's directed verdict. Merino v. Albertson's, Inc.. 975 
P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1999), reh'g denied (April 14, 1999). This Court must reverse the 
trial court because Collins sustained her burden of demonstrating the Center's negligence. 
The undisputed facts show that the Center owed Collins a duty to reasonably 
protect her, in light of her increased seizures, and recent seizure fall injury. The Center's 
duty arose from Collins' IHP, the Center's Client Safety Policy, the Center's Seizure - No 
Swimming Policy, and the Center's twenty-eight years of comprehensive care for Collins 
individual needs. Aplt. Brief at 13-14. The Center undertook seizure safety measures 
for Collins during her years at the Center, including requiring Collins to wear a helmet 
and preventing Collins from swinging when she was actively seizuring. App. Brief at 15. 
Collins presented competent evidence that the Center had a duty to reasonably protect her 
from injuries in connection with her seizures. 
The undisputed facts show that the Center breached its duty to Collins. It is self-
evident that the Center breached its duty to protect Collins, especially given Collins' 
profound disabilities. The Center does not dispute that it failed to consider that Collins 
might seizure and fall from her swing. Aplt. Brief, at 16, Facts f 26. The staff had 
already recognized that Collins5 elevated seizure activity increased her risk of injury, and 
required her to wear a helmet. Aplt. Brief at 15, Facts If 21. Even though Collins 
continued to seizure, no staff considered the possible injuries to Collins if she were 
permitted to swing, and fell from a significant height. Id. at 16, Facts ffif 24 and 26. 
Although the Center had previously prevented Collins from swinging when her seizure 
activity was high, the Center did not modify (or even think of modifying) any of Collins' 
recreational activities to take into account her increased scope of seizure fall injuries. Id. 
at page 15, Facts f 22, and at page 16, Facts f 26. Utah law does not require expert 
testimony where jurors need no assistance to understand the evidence. See, e.g.. Nixdorf 
v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) (no expert testimony required when propriety 
of the treatment received is within common knowledge of laymen). The facts show that 
the Center breached its duty to reasonably protect Collins. 
To summarize, the trial court erred when it granted the Center's directed verdict 
because Collins presented competent evidence of the Center's duty to Collins and its 
breach of that duty. No expert testimony was required because jurors could understand 
the Center's duty to reasonably take into account Collins' needs and appropriately limit 
2 
her activities. The Center's failure to consider the likelihood of serious injury to Collins 
by letting her swing in her condition demonstrated its breach of duty to Collins, and 
required no expert testimony for jurors to understand. Collins also presented undisputed 
evidence of causation and damages. This Court reviews the facts in the light most 
favorable to Collins, and because Collins made out her prima facie case of negligence, 
this Court must reverse the district court's directed verdict. 
II THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT DOES NOT 
REQUIRE EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("The Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 
(Supp. 1998), does not require expert testimony to state a cause of action. The Center 
argues that any and all claims falling under the Act require expert testimony. Aple. Brief 
at 10-13. The language of the Act, however, belies the Center's argument. The Act 
contains no expert testimony requirement. It makes no distinction among contract, tort, 
breach of warranty, or other claims: they are all "malpractice" actions for the purpose of 
applying the requirements of the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14). To the contrary, 
the separate listing of claims, shows that the designation of, for example, a contract claim 
as a "malpractice" action for the purposes of the Act does not change the underlying 
character of the claim. Put another way, a plaintiff with a contract claim that falls under 
the Act must still demonstrate the elements of offer, acceptance and consideration, even if 
the Act deems it a "malpractice" action. The mere designation as a "malpractice" action 
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does not mandate expert testimony. To require expert testimony for every claim arising 
under the Act would radically alter the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules 
of Evidence in ways that the legislature surely did not intend. The Center's position that 
expert testimony is required of all actions encompassed under the Act is untenable. 
The problems and consequences of the Center's position are well demonstrated in 
Collins' case. While the trial court admitted that Collins' case was not a classic medical 
malpractice case, it failed to recognize that under the facts of this case, this distinction 
eliminated the need for expert testimony in the issues of duty and breach. This is because 
there is a difference between classic medical malpractice cases, and actions that arise 
under the Act (hereinafter: "statutory medical malpractice actions"). Classic medical 
malpractice cases generally involve a breach of the duty of a medical professional owed 
to a tort victim, while statutory medical malpractice can include any actions, even 
contract and breach of warranty actions. The failure to distinguish between a statutory 
medical malpractice claim, and a classic medical malpractice claim is critical: the latter 
generally require expert testimony, see e.g..Chadwick v. Nielson. 763 P.2d 817, 821 n.4 
(Utah Ct. App. !988) (holding that standard of care must be established by expert medical 
testimony to present prima facie medical malpractice case involving doctor negligence); 
statutory malpractice claims may not need expert testimony to make out a prima facie 
case. The Center's argument simply abandons this critical analysis, as the trial court did 
in this case. 
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In this case, the trial court concluded that specialized care was involved but failed 
to explain what specific specialized care was at issue. This was especially vexing 
because it was undisputed that no staff considered restricting Collins9 swinging in light of 
her seizures. Even assuming, arguendo, that specialized care was involved, as a threshold 
matter, the Center failed to consider how the specialized care should be used to protect 
Collins during her increased seizure activity. Regardless of the level of specialized care 
that might have been required to assess the risk of seizure injury to Collins, the 
responsible parties or institution must first identify the risk. Consequently, even 
assuming the breach of a specific professional was alleged - - which it was not - - the 
facts show that no staff ever considered restricting Collins' swinging in connection with 
her seizures. The Center committed a sin of omission by failing to take the first step to 
reasonably protect Collins - identifying the risk of serious injury if she seizured while 
swinging. There was simply no need for expert testimony under these facts. 
In this case, the trial court concluded that expert testimony was required but failed 
to explain why or what care was implicated. Appellant named only the facility as a 
whole and never alleged negligence on the part of any specific individual. Similarly, the 
facts show that the duty to protect Collins ran to the facility as a whole. See, e.g.. Client 
Safety Policy; Seizure - No Swimming List; and IHP for Vickie L. Collins. The Center's 
position would permit other trial courts to abandon their analysis of the duty of care owed 
to tort victims. This Court must reject the Center's position because it is unwarranted by 
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statute, conflicts with established Utah precedent concerning the use of expert testimony, 
and would introduce confusion and barriers to plaintiff in simple negligence actions, such 
as Collins.' 
Ill THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
REFUSED TO QUALIFY DR. MUSTARD AS AN EXPERT 
WITNESS. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it prevented Dr. Mustard from testifying 
as to the standard of care. As a threshold matter, the trial court abuses its discretion when 
it is based on a misapplication of law. The trial court based its exclusion of Dr. Mustard 
on its mistaken belief that risk management was not at issue in Collins' case.1 Dr. 
Mustard was prepared to testify as to risk management that applied to facilities like the 
Center. The Center does not dispute that Dr. Mustard was qualified to testify in this area 
of his expertise. Instead, it argues that Dr. Mustard was not qualified because he holds 
different credentials than Collins' caregivers. While this argument assumes that 
appropriate care was provided to Collins, it is undisputed that NO STAFF MEMBER 
CONSIDERED MODIFYING COLLINS' SWINGING IN CONNECTION WITH HER 
INCREASED SEIZURE ACTIVITY. The Center can not make distinctions about the 
1
 As illustrated in Appellant's brief, the trial court's failure to explain what care it 
believed was at issue confounds any attempt to make sense of its actions. Given that the trial 
court granted Collins' motion in limine because the Center failed to consider modifying Collins' 
swinging in connection with her seizures, one may well ask why any expert testimony was 
required to show that the entire Center failed to act. That said, if risk management was not at 
issue in Collins' case, what "specialized care" was instead at issue? 
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qualifications between Dr. Mustard and the Center's staff members, where no staff 
member acted to reasonably protect Collins.2 Where the entire facility failed to consider 
the risks to Collins of swinging in an open swings in her condition, Collins put risk 
management squarely at issue. This Court should find that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it refused to permit Dr. Mustard to testify. 
IV THIS COURT MUST CONSIDER COLLINS' SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP CLAIM BECAUSE IT WAS SUBSUMED IN HER 
NEGLIGENCE ACTION, AND ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL 
COURT'S PLAIN ERROR / EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
JUSTIFY THIS COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP. 
Collins' special duty argument was subsumed in her negligence action. The 
special relationship outlined in Collins' brief is not a separate cause of action. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4). Instead, it is one of many factual scenarios 
upon which a tort victim in a negligence action can establish a duty of care owed by the 
tort feasors. Collins established the facts that gave rise to the special relationship claim 
before the trial court. See Appt. Brief at 13-14, ^  8, 10, and 17, and discussion at 30-33. 
Collins was precluded, however, from telling the jury in closing argument that they could 
find a special relationship between Collins and the Center based on the facts presented at 
trial. Consequently, the trial court's grant of directed verdict denied Collins the right to 
present her case to the jury. 
2
 This further supports the conclusion that no expert testimony was required to 
show a breach of the standard of care under Collins' facts. 
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Like all duties in negligence cases, the duty contemplated by a "special 
relationship" between two parties is established by facts. The Center's special 
relationship to Collins is not a new issue. Instead, the facts show that for twenty eight 
years, the Center provided comprehensive care for Collins, and selected her activity 
choices, taking into account her severe mental retardation, schizophrenia, and other 
limitations. The conclusion that the Center owed Collins the affirmative duty to 
reasonably protect her follows from these facts. The Center may not ignore the 
undisputed facts in Collins' negligence action, and claim that Collins has raised new 
issues. The Center's argument simply has no application to Collins' case, and should be 
ignored. 
Alternatively, the trial court's plain error and/or exceptional circumstances 
warrants review of Collins' special relationship claim on appeal. 
Under rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this court may take notice of 
"plain error" that affects the party's "substantial rights." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 
853 (Utah 1992). This case meets the plain error requirements: 1) an error exists - the 
Court's grant of directed verdict which took the case from the jury ; 2) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court - Collins pointed out the trial court's error before it 
granted the directed verdict; and 3) the error is harmful - Collins was prevented from 
putting her negligence case before the jury. State v. Dunn, 850 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 
1993). 
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Exceptional circumstances also warrant review of Collins' special relationship by 
this Court. The concept of exceptional circumstances has been described as "elusive" 
and "ill-defined," and has decided on a case-by-case basis. Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1209, n.3.3 
Collins' case presents compelling facts that warrant invoking the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine. Collins' negligence case raise very fact-specific questions of 
duty and breach, which typically are determined by the jury as the trier of fact. The trial 
court's directing of a verdict for the Center precluded the fact finder's deliberations. 
These are exceptional circumstances that warrant this Court's consideration of Collins 
special relationship with the Center. 
This Court should properly consider Collins' special relationship with the Center 
because it was plainly subsumed in her negligence action, and Collins presented the 
requisite facts to claim this relationship to the Center. Alternatively, this Court should 
consider Collins' special relationship to the Center because of the trial court's plain error, 
exceptional circumstances, and to do substantial justice. 
3
 For a good review of cases discussing the exceptional circumstances doctrine, see 
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 8-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of 
directed verdict, and remand this case. Collins made out a prima facie case of negligence, 
and this Court must review the facts in a light most favorable to Collins. The trial court 
erred in holding expert testimony was required because jurors could understand the 
Center's duty and breach from the testimony of the witnesses and documents admitted 
into evidence at trial. The trial court abused its discretion because it committed legal 
error, or alternatively abused its discretion when it refused to permit Dr. Mustard to 
testify about applicable risk management standards. Finally, Collins' special relationship 
argument is subsumed in her negligence action, and is not a separate cause of action, and 
should be considered by this Court. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial 
court, and remand this case for a new trial. 
DATED this 25th day of May, 1999. 
KING & ISAACSON, P.C. 
Brian S. King 
Richard R. Burke 
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